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Type of bind: Hardcover
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.5311
EAN num: 9780826414496
ISBN number: 0826414494
Label: Continuum
Manufacturer: Continuum
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 560
Printing Date: 2002-11
Publishing house: Continuum
Sale Popularity Level: 1066819
Studio: Continuum
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Product Description:
Historians have hitherto devoted attention almost exclusively to political and diplomatic issues, more especially to Hitler and the Nazis, as the root causes of the Second World War. Economic affairs and trade and business investments in the prewar period have been little noticed. Arguing that previous historians have confused effect for cause and have considered these political, diplomatic and ideological disputes without reference to the systemic problems that provoked them, Paul Hehn focuses on the fierce rivalries among the Great Powers in the relentless search for markets in during the world depression of the 1930's, particularly in southeastern Europe where Germany created a semi-colonial , economic and trade hegemony. In all, the book deals with the five Major Powers and all the Eastern European countries from the Baltic to Turkey but focuses primarily on Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.
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Rated by buyers 
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Paul Hehn's book "A Low Dishonest Decade", referring to a quotation from W.H. Auden, is one of the best books on the origins of World War II to appear in a long time. A necessary corrective to the overly politics and military strategy-centered analysis of popular writers like Overy, Paul Hehn gives an exceedingly expansive and thorough analysis of the economic interests of the classes and their governments in various countries and how these steered mankind into the most destructive war the world has ever seen.
Of course the main question in these books that interests the common reader is the one of blame: how could WWII and the temporary dominance of fascism have been prevented, and why did this not happen? Hehn's economic and statistical analysis gives some strong answers to these questions, without obviously making us forget that we are speaking from hindsight, and that the way to hell is paved with good intentions.
The German drive for expansionism is shown to have been inevitable, given that Hitler had decided to rearm. Since Germany had a permanent shortage of foodstuffs and raw materials as the result of its strong rearmament programme, and due to Versailles sanctions it also lacked the necessary gold and foreign currency to pay for importing it, it had to look abroad for the necessary materials. On the one hand, this was done by annexing Austria and the Czechs, which provided Germany with necessary boosts in reserves and materials during periods of crisis to allow the rearmament to continue a bit longer, and on the other hand, Germany pursued a program of using subsidized trade to make the various Eastern European states dependent on Germany, forcing them into political vassalage from which they could not escape. The failure of Polish attempts to appease the Germans and the Allies as well consequently led to the invasion of that country by Germany in 1939, with Hitler fully believing that British guarantees would once again be broken.
On the British side, the strong interests in Germany of the British upper class and British finance capital consistently kept the government from exercising a strong anti-German policy, which in turn sabotaged every French endeavor at creating a strong alliance in the east to ward off German expansionism. The betrayal of the Czechs by British diplomacy was later followed by betraying Romania and Yugoslavia to the Nazis, all done in the name of protecting British trading interests in Germany as well as to prevent France, the USSR, and the US from gaining a foothold on the continent at the expense of British power. The short-sightedness and treasonous self-interest of the British upper class and of British capital is remarkable, and probably, aside from their German counterparts, the main reason all attempts to restrain Hitler's ambitions failed entirely.
Then of course there is the consideration of Germany's own industrial capital, and their interests. Hehn shows very well how the NSDAP was consistently sponsored and financed by German industrial interests, in particular the large companies of IG Farben and Krupp, which had everything to gain from a programme of increased rearmaments and subsequent war. IG Farben's needs for raw materials such as copper and chrome led it to pressure the Nazi government into further expansionism in Eastern Europe, in order to obtain the valuable stores of raw materials there, particularly in Yugoslavia. The German banks were also highly culpable, collaborating in every criminal Nazi undertaking in order to quickly obtain the benefits of plunder of foreign nations, such as taking over the strong banking establishments of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Of course Hitler's 'Lebensraum' ideals played a significant role on their own, but this was not a new concept, and in many ways the German policy of this time was (as AJP Taylour has stressed) a continuation of Wilhelmian imperialist ideals, now made even more criminal by the racist and genocidal elements contained in them.
Paul Hehn has done a masterful job showing how the fusion of various states' economic interests, in reality the interests of their ruling classes, and their political power play led to a nightmarish descent into war and genocide from which none could escape. He goes into much detail about the neocolonial interests in Eastern Europe of the various Great Powers, but also shows how these nations themselves responded to this and what their own socio-economic structures were, such as those of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Overall, the French and the Americans seem to come off as least shameful and treasonous from Hehn's analysis (though each had plenty of cowardly and damaging actions on record), whereas the British, with their inclinations towards Germany in the hope of profit and defeating communism, come off particularly poorly.
The main downside of the book is that it is far too long, and ... Read More
Rated by buyers 
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July 12, 2003
A Low Dishonest Decade
By: Paul N. Hehn
A Low Dishonest Decade is an account of German economic and financial policy and its design upon the diplomatic and political relations that inexorably leads to World War II.
In reading this book, it is assumed the reader has a fairly sophisticated knowledge of pre-war German trade policy, economics, finance, natural resources and the foreign policy positions of both Europe and the United States. Written in chronological format with business style statistics, the author outlines German Third Reich foreign policy actions in direct historical context to the economic and natural resource issues of the pre-war period. And unlike some written accounts of the Third Reich that chronicle revisionist history and unsubstantiated arguments, A Low Dishonest Decade combines economics, strategy and historical events into a very readable documentary. The reader is continually reminded of the precarious financial and natural resource situation facing Germany and this almost desperate and imperative situation advancing Germany's strategic aims prior to the outbreak of military aggression in 1939. Also included is a survey of European countries, diplomatic agreements and the crucial decisions by leaders in world commodity markets as proactive and reactive agents to the realties facing Germany and its future. Along the 405 pages are photos from the Getty archives of important policy leaders, a boundary line map of Hungary from the Library of Congress, and a glossary of key names and diplomatic agreements, the later of which appears to be missing.
Although the primary focus of this book is on markets, economics and finance also included in the typeface is a limited strategy of the German military forces and the political "Mein Kampf" Liebenstraum ideology affecting this transitional period of economic initiative to offensive warfare.
Sean Marche
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